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Suarez, Immortality, and the Soul's 
Dependence on the Body 
James B. South 
The starting point for this essay is the year 1500 . As a date, it certainly sounds 
auspicious-a mere seventeen years before Luther and his ninety-five theses, thirty 
years before Copernicus put down in writing some of his thoughts, forty years before 
the issuance by Pope Paul III of R egimini militantis ecclesi and the fo unding of the Society 
of Jesus, and forty-eight years before the birth of Francisco Suarez. In 1500, in a 
classroom in Padua, Pietro Pomponazzi stated that two conditions needed to be met in 
order to show that the soul is immortal: the soul (or the intellect at any rate) must be 
(1) free from bodily location and (2) free from the mediating role of bodily powers . In 
his technical language, if the soul is to be considered immortal, the body cannot be a 
subject for an immortal intellective soul, that is, the so ul 's operations cannot exclusively 
take place in bodily organ. At the same time the soul should not need the body as an 
object, that is, the body cannot be a necessary condition for all operations of the 
intellect.1 It was another sixteen years before Pomponazzi would publish his £'unous 
treatise On the Immortality if the Soul in which he argued that neither condition could be 
defended philosophically. That was three years after the Fifth Lateran Council in its 
eighth session declared that there were three most pernicious errors corrupting the 
minds ofthe faithful : that the ra tional soul is mortal, that there is one rational soul for all 
humans, and that either of these claims can be true according to philosophy. In short 
Pompanazzi's later work set off a firestorrn of controversy over the issue of immortality. 
It is too big a question to ask here what it was about these twenty- five years or so that 
made the issue of immortality so crucial and the rhetorical pitch so high. It was certainly 
not unprecedented to doubt the demonstrability of inm10rtality . Scotus had done 
so , and Cajetan during the 1520s-after becoming a Cardinal-classed the immortality 
of the soul, along with the Trinity, as topics about which philosophers had no 
certain knowledge. Nonetheless between the Council and the Pomponazzi affair, 
I See Pietro Pomponazzi, Corsi il1editi dell'il1segl1amemo padovallo, I1 ' :Qllaesliol'les physicae et all illlasticae decem' 
(1 499-1500; 1503-4), ed. Antonino Poppi (Padua: Antenore, 1970), 1-25. The two conditions are stated 
on 18. 
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as Martin Pine has correctly noted, the controversy concern ing immortality 'produ-
ced the most important debate within sixteenth century Christendom prior to the 
R eformation . ,2 
In what follows I connect Suarez to this immortality debate. Suarez certainly knew 
Pomopnazzi's work, although most scholars writing on Suarez are more likely to 
situate him in the context of the tradition of Scholastic thought rather than the more 
secular Aristotelianism prevalent at Padua and elsewhere in Italy throughout the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Typically, in fact, Suarez situated himself within the 
Scholastic tradition and that self-positioning is apparent in the texts on which I focus . 
Nonetheless, I think that a careful reading of Suarez's discussion ofinunortality shows 
that his thought here was decisively shaped by Pomponazzi's challenge. 
Suarez's most extensive discussion ofimmoltality occurs in Disputation 2, qu estion 3 
of his Commentary on the De anima. 3 After having treated of the nutritive and sensitive 
souls in the first two questions of the disputation, in Question 3 he asked: 'Whether the 
principle of human understanding is something incorporeal, subsistent, and inunortal?' 
In answering this he drew six conclusions. The fmt was that the human soul is 
inmuterial and subsistent. W e will return to the argument he provided for that view. 
H e then provided a second conclusion: the human intellective principle is immortal . 
And then a third conclusion: the oldest and most important philosophers think the soul 
is immortal, as do the vast majority of humans throughout history. And these ancient 
philosophers and this multitude of common humanity came to this conclusion through 
the light of natural reason apart from the illumination of faith . At this point, though, 
Suarez admitted that there is one striking omission in his list of eminent philosophers 
who accept immortality, namely Aristotle. Accordingly he promised to return to a 
discussion of Aristotle's own account. H aving treated the philosophical arguments for 
inunortality, he proceeded to discuss the place of the claim of llru110rtality within the 
realm offaith. So Suarez's fourth conclusion is that it is 'most certain ' according to the 
Catholic faith that the soul never perishes. The fifth conclusion is that faith teaches not 
only the inunortality of the soul but that the soul is iJrunortal by its nature and not 
through some special gift of God. Finally, he maintained that it is most pious and 
2 Martin Pine, Pietro Pompo/"lazzi: Radical Philosopher if the RCtlaissa,.lCe, Saggi e Testi 21 (Padua: Antenore, 
1986),61. Pine provides a good overview of the work ofPompanzzi, ca refully situating it within its historical 
context and cOlm ecting it with previous thinkers such as Duns Scotus and Cajetan (Thomas de Viol. 
3 This work dates from 1572, early in Suarez's ca reer as a teacher at Segovia. The work was never 
published in his lifetime, although late in his career he began revising it fo r publication. The edition printed in 
Suarez, Francisco, M. Andre , Charles Berton, and Antoine T heophile Duval, R. p. Fra/"lcisci Sliarez . . . Opera 
olf",ia (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vives, 1856) is based on a 1621 edition compiled by P. Alvarez. Alvarez used 
the revised text as it existed through the first eighteen questions, combined with the earlier text and various 
supplemental texts. I follow instead the recent critical edition of the manuscripts of the 1572 lectures: 
Francisco Suarez, Commentaria 11/70 Cl/ ln questio/"liblls ill libros Adstote/is De anima, edited by Salvador Castellote, 
3 vols: (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicationes (vols. 1 and 2) and Fundacion Xavier Zubiri (vol. 3), 
1978-91. I will abbreviate future references to this work as CDA. This text is available online at <http:// 
www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm>. 
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consistent with faith to hold that the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated 
through natural reason. 
In this chapter I will avoid talking about the last three points since such a discussion 
would take us too far afield by propelling us into a study of the context of Suarez's 
teaching and the need to deal with the skeptical tendencies within both the Catholic 
and Protestant discussions of immortality. Instead, in what follows we are only going to 
treat his conclusions concerning the philosophical arguments for immortality and the 
interpretation of Aristotle. 
One additional preliminary note is in order. As I proceed the reader might be 
surprised that no mention is made of Averroes . In fact Suarez devoted a separate 
question to Averroes 's teaching concerning the intellective soul. Still the dispute 
between Suarez and Averroes was not the same as the one that he treats in the question 
on inm10rtality. Certainly Averroes thought that the intellective soul is immortal. 
Hence, it makes sense that the question of the number of intellects would arise 
subsequent to Question 3, which gives us reason to believe that the intellective soul 
can exist apart from the body. However, in case you are curious about Suarez's attitude 
towards Averroesism, he considered it not only opposed to faith but philosophically 
'sheer delirium and unintelligible error.'4 
I: The probable arguments 
While the bulk of this chapter will deal with Suarez's one demonstrative argument for 
immortality and his reading of Aristotle, I would be remiss if I did not mention the 
arguments that he thought indicated, but don' t prove, that the soul is immortal . These 
arguments are unoriginal and I think it is pretty clear that Suarez included them because 
they were current. There is a noticeable lack of enthusiasm and, more striking still, an 
uncharacteristic brevity in his treatment of them . 
The first has to do with God's providential governance of the world . The point here 
is that the wicked are to be punished and the virtuous rewarded. Yet looking around it 
is pretty obvious that the world does not work that way-the wicked live lives full of 
delight, while the virtuous live lives filled with toil. This is incompatible with God's 
ruling providence. Accordingly there must be an afterlife in which the good receive 
what is due to them and the wicked receive their just deserts. 
A second argument concerns the end of the soul. Everything has an end in which it 
rests once it has achieved it. Yet we rarely find rest in this life because of all the troubles 
we meet with along the way. So the soul's immortality is needed to provide an 
opportunity to rest in our beatitude. 
A third argument concerns a natural desire in humans, namely, that we all desire to 
live forever. It would be strange if such a natural desire were frustrated. Oddly Suarez 
4 'merum delirium et error inintelligibilis' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 4, no. 2, 1: 254). 
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does not dwell on this argument, even though he surely knew it was the centerpiece of 
Marsilio Ficino's argument for human immortality in his Platonic Theology.s 
Instead he quickly moved on to a fourth argument, one taken from human dignity. 
It is clear, he stated, that humans are both the head (caput) and end of the entire 
universe. As such, it would be absurd should humans live no longer than the beasts 
who serve them or more briefly than the sun that provides us with wam1th. 
Finally the fifth argument was concemed with virtue. The idea is that our awareness 
of immortality is the foundation of virtue . Without such an awareness of immortality, 
humans would live as animals and would fall into baseless thoughts such as 'Let us eat 
and drink , for tomorrow we may die,' or (quoting Augustine) 'If the soul is mortal, 
I think that the palm goes to Epicurus.'6 
Now all of these arguments are contestable. More importantly, all had in fact been 
contested. Pomopnazzi had argued, for example, that virtue was its own reward and 
that the rationality of pursuing virtue was relatively evident. I do not want to dwell on 
the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments in any detail. It is sufficient to note 
that Suarez was convinced that these arguments were not demonstrative. He stated that 
the most powerful is the first: the wicked must be punished and the virtuous rewarded 
ifindeed God is the providential ruler of the world . Their most striking commonality is 
that all concemed what we might call the practical side of human life: our desires, 
virtue, happiness, and the like. By contrast, the demonstrative argument to follow is 
fLITnly situated on the theoretical side. 
II: The demonstrative argument 
The second conclusion in the Third Disputation is that the immortality of the soul can 
be demonstrated evidently by natural reason. That is a very strong claim and one hopes 
for a strong argument. Here's the argument: 
st. Thomas demonstrates this conclusion at I, q. 75, a. 6 from what has preceded, for the rational 
soul is per se subsistent; therefore, it is incorruptible. The consequence is clear, for it is corrupted 
either per se or per accidens. Now, it is not corrupted per accidens since it belongs to something to be 
generated and corrupted in the way in which it exists. Therefore, in the case of that to which 
existence belongs per se, it belongs to it to be generated or corrupted per se, or it belongs to it in no 
way. Now, he proves that it does not belong to it per se, for what is form alone and subsistent 
cannot possibly be corrupted per se. It is proved: for, what belongs per se to something cannot 
possibly be separa ted from it. Now, existence belongs per se to fonn. Therefore, it is impossible 
for existence to be separated from form; therefore, it is impossible for fonn to be corrupted.7 
Marsilio Ficino, 771eologia Plato,.,ica , Book I, chap ter 1 and Book XlV. For discussion, see Paul Oskar 
Kristeller, II Pel1siero Filosojico de Marsi/io Ficino (Florence: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1988),200-12. 
6 'Comedamus et bibamus, cras enim moriemur. . .. Si animus est morralis, in anim o meo Epicurus habet 
palmam' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 32, 1: 202) . 
7 'Hanc conclusionem demonstrat D. Thomas, I p. , q. 75, a. 6, ex praecedenti, nam anima rationalis est 
per se subsistens; ergo est incorruptibilis. Patet consequentia, [nam] vel corrumperetur per se, vel per accidens; 
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Suarez asserted that this argument is sufficiently metaphysical, acute, and demonstra-
tive, but he also admjtted that it is obscure and proceeds to provide some clarifica tion. 
First Suarez did a little definitional work. After all one might trunk it a bit odd to say 
that nature could intend corruption per se since it is more accurate to say that nature 
intends generation per se. So he clarified the sense of corruption by restricting corrup-
tion per se to that which first temunates a corruption, that is, to what primarily ceased to 
exist in a corruption. By contrast corruption per accidens occurs when something ceases 
to be as the result of the cessation of something else. This ra ther concise account is 
illuminated by an example: when fi re is generated fro m air, air is said to be corrupted 
per se. But the form of air and some of its accidents are said to cease to be as a result of 
such a per se corruption, that is, they are corrupted per accidens. So, restricting himself to 
forms, Suarez accepted that a fonn could be corrupted in two ways: it could be 
corrupted per accidens, that is, when the whole is corrupted. T hat is, when air becomes 
fi re the fonn of air is corrupted since the form of air cannot exist on its own. It is in this 
way that all material fom1s cease to be. But as a subsistent fo rm the human soul is 
different fro m a material fo rm since it does not cease to be when it is separated fro m its 
body because it has its being per se and independently of the body. Thus the corruption 
of a subsistent form, say the form of a human being, must be corrupted per se if it is 
corrupted at all . O f course the assumption here is that existence belongs to subsistent 
fo nns per se.8 
That assumption warrants additional explication and Suarez provided it. Existence 
belongs to f01111 in such a way that through form it belongs to the fom1 to have 
existence . So if a form is subsistent, existence belongs to it as such as it is the proper 
receptive capacity of existence. But if a fonn is not subsistent, existence belongs to it as 
a principle by which the composite exists. In short a form is that which ful fills the 
proper receptive capacity of existence, and hence we cannot attribute existence to 
anything except by attributing form to it. And, obviously enough, it follows that we 
cannot separate existence from something unless we separate it from its form. But since 
a fo rm cannot be separated from itself, if existence belongs to a form as such, then the 
form cannot be separated from existence, and that means the form is incorruptible. 9 
Now, I want to say two things about this argument. First the argument is not very 
strong, and second Suarez recognized, despite his claim to the contrary, that it was not a 
very strong argument. N ow the relative weakness of the argument is easy to charac-
terize, and R obert Pasnau has done a nice j ob summarizing the worry (although as we 
shall see, the argument against it goes back at least to the sixteenth century). Aquinas's 
non per accidens, qllia sic competit alicui fieri et comlInpi sicllt et esse; ergo clli convenit per se esse, convenit 
per se fieri et corrumpi, vel nllllo modo convenient. Q lIod alltem non per se conveniat probat, nam qllod est 
[onna cantllm et SlIbsistens, impossibile est per se cO ITlImpi. Probatllr, nam qllod per se alicui con venit, 
impossibile est separari ab ilIo; esse alltem per se convenit fonnae ; ergo impossibile est separari ab ilIa; ergo 
impossibile est corrumpi ' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 21, 1: 188). 
8 CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 21,1: 188. 
9 Ibid. no. 22, 1: 190. 
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argument (and Suarez's) is either badly mistaken or contains a serious omission. In 
Pasnau's words, 'by establishing that the human soul is subsistent, he has shown that it is 
not destroyed simply in virtue of the body's being destroyed ... . Yet the human soul 
might be dependent on the body in some other way.'l0 And, as Pasnau further notes, 
this objection apparently occurred to Aquinas himself, since in Summa theologiae la.75.6 
he raised this very claim as an objection and recognized the tight link between 
intellectual cognition and bodily existence: 
Moreover, nothing exists without its own proper operation. But the proper operation of the 
soul, which is to understand with a phantasm, cannot exist without the body. For, as is said in 
the De anima, the soul understands nothing without a phantasm (De anima III , 7 431a 16-17); and 
the phantasm does not exist without the body (De Anima I, 1 403a8-10). Therefore, when the 
body is destroyed, the soul cannot remain. 1 ! 
Aquinas 's response to this objection is striking: 'To the third, it must be said that to 
understand with a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul insofar as it is united to a 
body. But, separated from the body, it will have another mode of understanding, 
similar to other substances separated from the body, as will be clear below.'12 
Pasnau's assessment of this response is that it is 'lamely ad hoc.'13 In short Aquinas 
just admitted that his argument for immortality is either a complete sleight of hand or 
woefully incomplete. Unless he could properly show that the intellect can operate 
without the body, he did not really have a proof for the immortality of the soul. Or, 
with a slightly diffetent emphasis, unless it can be shown that the intellective soul does 
not need the body 'at all, it has not been shown that the intellect can survive when the 
body is destroyed. So even granted the claim that the soul is subsistent, Aquinas does 
not have a convincing argument for its inunortality. 14 
I now move on to my second claim, namely, that Suarez was aware of this gap in 
Aquinas ' argument. For support we need only look at the structure of his question on 
inunortality. Suarez devoted two and a half pages to a discussion of the demonstrative 
argument. Yet he devoted eleven pages to discussing exactly those passages in Aristotle 
that Thomas mentioned in his third objection. And, it should be added, he devoted 
10 Robert Pasnau, 77wmas Aquinas 01'1 Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 366. 
11 'Praeterea, nulla re~ est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae est intelligere cum 
phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma alltem non 
est sine corpore, lit dicitur in libro De anima. Ergo anima non potest remanere, destructo co rpore ' (ST, 1 a. 
q.75 , art. 6, obj. 3, 11: 26-8). 
!2 'Ad tertium dicendum guod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio an.imae secundum guod 
corpori est unita. Separata alltem a corpore habebit alium modum intelligendi , similem aliis substantiis a 
corpore separatis, lit infra melius patebit' (ST, 1 a.g . 75, art. 6, resp . 3, 11: 32). 
!3 Pasnau, 77lOmas Aquinas on HI/man Nature, 366. 
14 Since this chapter is not about Aquinas, I am not going to worry further about the way Aquinas himself 
deals with the possible ad hoc quality of his response. The interested reader could profitably consult Joseph 
Owens, 'Aquinas on the Inseparability of the Soul from Existence,' in Towards a Christiall Philosophy 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 291-306; Richard Cross, ' Is Aquinas's 
Prooffor the Indestructibility of the Soul Successful?' BritishJoumalJor the History oJPhiiosophy 5 (1997): 1-20. 
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much more time to these passages than any other discussion in this question. In short he 
recognized that everything hinged on these texts and how they should be interpreted. 
As previously mentioned, in 1500 Pomponazzi set the parameters for the way this 
question was going to be discussed in the sixteenth century and placed the emphasis on 
the intellect's dependence on phantasms rather than its per se subsistence. Indeed in his 
discussion of Aquinas in the De immortalitate of1516 Pomponazzi did not even mention 
the argument for inUTIortality based on subsistence. Instead he argued that Aquinas 
misunderstood the way the intellect depended on the body in cognition . When 
Gasparo Contarini, a former student of Pomponazzi, wrote his treatise against the De 
immortalitate, it was precisely this fac t that he seized on. Pomponazzi, he claimed, had 
overlooked the key role that subsistence played in the Angelic Doctor's argument. But 
once this aspect of Thomas' argument was bro ught to his attention Pomponazzi became 
dismissive, stating that an Aristotelian account offonn and matter requires that the form 
cannot be separated from the body in any natural way. The emphasis there is on the 
'natural' since Pomponazzi did recognize at least one instance in which fom1 and matter 
are separated: the case of the sacrament of the Mass. But that was clearly a miraculous 
separation, not a natural one, and Pomponazzi maintained that the philosopher should 
not explain the relation of soul and body in tenns of a divine miracle. 15 
So despite Contarini 's attempt to reorient the discussion, Pomponazzi returned to 
the crucial issue of the relation between the intellect and corporeal organs in cognition: 
By the interior senses we know the universal in a certain way. For although we cannot attain the 
pure universal through the interior senses, we still arrive at a certain indetenninate knowledge that is, 
as it were, the mean between the singular and the universal, and which is called the knowledge of the 
indifferent singular. For we think of the elephant, although not of this one or that one, but it still is 
not a universal cognition. After these cognitions, we ascend through the in tellect to the nature of the 
elephant in a universal sense, which is neither a defmite individual nor a particular cognition, since 
the first is the fun ction of the external senses while the second is the fun ction of the internal senses. 
But although this occurs in this way, nevertheless it is not free from some support (adminiwlo) of 
sense because it cannot be accomplished without a phantasm, as we experience in ourselves. 16 
So in stressing that Pomponazzi connected sense cognition and intellectual cognition in 
such a way that the intellect cannot exist without sense, I want to show that the terms 
of the debate as Suarez had to address them were to be fo und in an account of 
cognition rather than in the metaphysics of form. And it is an account of cognition 
in which the demarcation between sense (both external and internal) and intellect 
becomes clear. In addition to the apparent philosophical incompleteness of Aquinas' 
argument, then, the debate over in1mortality as framed by Pomponazzi contributed to 
Suarez's strategy in discussing texts fro m Aristotle even after having given what he 
claims is a demonstrative argument for immortality based on subsistent fom1. 
15 For discussion ofPomponazzi and Contarini, see Pine, Pompol1azz i, 144-53. 
16 Pomponazzi, Apologia I, 1, cited and translated by Pine, Pompollazz i, 193 (translation slightly modified 
by me). The Apologia dates from 1518. 
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III: Suarez and some texts from Aristotle 
'The mind of Aristotle is exceedingly obscure on this point.' Suarez was talking about 
Aristotle's view concerning immortality. Despite the obscurity of Aristotle's texts, he 
had a definite view of how to read them. Aristotle, Suarez believed, accepted the 
immortality of the soul but for some reason never said so explicitly (perhaps because he 
did not have a demonstrative argument or perhaps because he had nothing to say about 
the status of the separated soul).17 Suarez tried to convince us that there are passages 
that reveal the real mind of Aristotle. But rather than run through Suarez's reading of a 
number of Aristotelian texts, I simply want to show how he approached the problem of 
interpreting Aristotle. For from that starting point we shall soon be in a position to see 
his absolutely critical and rather startling move. 
There are three passages from the first book of the De anima around which Suarez 
framed his discussion. 18 The fmt of these is set forth as a conditional: if understanding is 
phantasy, that is, a kind of imagination or it is not without imagination, then under-
standing cannot exist without the body. The other two texts he considered were 
propositions that Aristotle set forth as 'foundations and fmt principles ' for investigating 
the question of immortality. These are (1) if the human soul has some proper way of 
being affected or some proper operation, it can be separated from the body and (2) if 
there is no proper way of its being affected, or there is no proper operation, it is not 
separable. These two go together since they follow from another claim in Book I: 
operation is proportioned to potency and potency is proportioned to form-so that 
operation follows form as a second act to the first act. Setting aside discussion of the 
conditional, Suarez drew the following conclusion from the two first principles found 
in Book I: if an operation has no dependence on the body as from a subject, then the 
form from which it flows will have no dependence on the body as from a subject. This 
rather opaque conclusion simply means that the intellect's operation (and hence the 
foml to which it is proportioned) must not exist in a corporeal organ. But if every 
operation has a dependence on the body, the form will have a dependence as well . 
Thus it takes only one operation with no dependence on the body to show the independence 
of the foml no matter how many other of its operations might be so dependent. 19 
Let us slow down, though, and see how he derived that conclusion from the two 
ftrst principles. In his discussion of these two first principles Suarez began from the 
17 'Est en im in hac parte obscura valde Aristotelis mens' (CDA. disp. 2. q. 3. no. 36. 1: 210-12). 
18 Ibid. no. 38. 1: 214. Cf 'A further problem presented by the affections of soul is tllis: are they all 
affections of the complex of body and soul. or is there anyone among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To 
detennine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them. there seems to be no case in 
wllich the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger. courage. appetite. and 
sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this toO proves to be a fonn of 
imagination or to be impossible witho ut imagination. it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If 
there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul. soul will be capable of separate existence; 
if there is none. its separate existence is impossible' (ARI. 403a2-12. 1: 642). 
19 CDA. disp. 2. q. 3. noAO. 1: 216. 
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following basic premise: all vital operations, that is, all the operations that living beings 
perfom1, for example, breathing, eating, sensing, and, in humans, understanding, have 
their origin exclusively in the soul. This follows from the very definition of the soul as 
the first principle of life . Now some operations of the soul, for example, growth, 
nutrition, and sensing originate in the soul but are perfected in the body. The technical 
tem1 that Suarez invoked here is that they are all 'subjected' (subiectantur), that is, they 
exist in the body as in a subject. These operations are the so-called 'common' 
operations of the soul. By contrast a proper operation of the soul is one that originates 
in the soul, as all vital operations must, but also is received in the soul (and so exists in 
the soul) without any corporeal instrument. The contrast is straightforward. Consider 
vision-the power of vision originates in the soul but can occur only by means of a 
corporeal instrument, the organ of sight. T ake away the organ of sight, say through 
injury, and vision cannot perform its operation. So what Suarez must find to prove the 
soul's immortality is a proper operation-one that needs no corporeal instrument for its 
functioning since only such an operation would not exist in the body as in a subject.2o 
Prior to Pomponazzi it was assumed that if one could show that there existed such a 
proper operation of the soul-understanding was the primary candidate-that would 
suffice to show that the soul did not depend on the body in such a way as to jeopardize 
its immortal status. As Suarez put it: ' thus, if an operation has no dependence on the 
body as on a subject, the form [the soul] will not have one.'21 But as we have seen, 
Pomponazzi changed the tenm of the debate with his claim that the problem of 
dependence was not just a matter of where the operation is terminated. Instead he 
pressed the objection that the 'objective' dependence of the soul on the body was 
sufficient to block the conclusion of immortality. That meant that Suarez could not rest 
with the mere assertion that there is an operation of the intellect that does not exist in a 
bodily organ subjectively. After all, Pomponazzi himself was as convinced of that 
position in regard to intellectual operations just as much as anyone who holds to 
immortality. As we saw in Pomponazzi's response to Contarini the issue comes down 
20 Much of the way that Suarez set up the problem came from Aquinas's Sellterlcia libri De allima, Book [, 
lectio 2: 'Quanwis autem hoc Aristoteles scilicet apen e manifestet in tenio huius, nihilominus tamen 
quantum ad hoc aliquid exponemus. Nam intelligere quodanunodo est proprium animae, quodammodo 
est coniuncti. Sciendum est igitur, quod aliqua operatio animae aut passio est, quae indiget corpore sicut 
instmmemo et sicut obiecto. Sicut videre indiget corpore , sicut obiecto, quia color, qui est obiectum visus, est 
in corpo re . Item sicut instrumento; quia visio, etsi sit ab anima, no n est calnen nisi per o rganulll visus, scilicet 
pupilJam, quae est ut instmmemum; et sic videre non est animae tamum, sed est organi . AEqua autem 
operatio est, quae indiget corpore, non tamen sicut instmmemo, sed sicut obiecto tantum. lntelligere enim 
non est per organum corporaJe, sed indiget obiecto corporaJi. Sicut enim philosoph us dicit in tenio huius, 
hoc modo phamasmata se habent ad intellectum, sicut colores ad visum. Colores autem se habent ad visum, 
sicut obiecta: phantasmata ergo se habent ad intellectllm sicut obiecta. C um autem phantasmata non sine sine 
corpore, videtu r quod intelligere non est sine corpore: it.1 tamen quod sit sicut obiectum et non sicut 
instmmentum.' [ cite texts from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's SenterlCia libri De anima (Rome: Leonine 
Conmlission, 1984), 45: l. 
21 'Et ideo si operatio nullam dependemiam habet a corpore, ut a subiecto , nec fom1a illam habeb it ' 
(CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 40, 1: 216). 
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to the' objective' relation between imagination and intellect. If the intellect is depen-
dent on the imagination as an object, then it cannot be immortal. 
What Suarez thus needed in order to overcome Pomponazzi's argument was a 
passage where Aristotle stated that the human soul does have some operation objec-
tively independent of the body as well as subjectively independent. N ow there is one 
very famo us passage that suggests Suarez is out ofluck and that is the third passage from 
De anima I, the conditional previously mentioned: if understanding is phantasy, that is, 
a kind of imagination, or it is not without imagination, then understanding cannot exist 
without the body22 In addition there is a very famous claim in book III of De anima,23 
which Suarez summarized bluntly as, 'we neither understand nor can understand 
without imagination.'24 N ow fro m the conditional and the claim in Book III , Suarez 
set out the argument he must refute: 
1. If to understand is imagination , or not without imagination, the soul is not 
separable. 
2. T o understand is not without imagination. 
Therefore, 
3 . T he soul is not separable. 
One way to deal with this argument is to do exactly what Aquinas did . Without 
naming T homas, Suarez pointed out that distinguishing between understanding in this 
life and understanding simply speaking is a possible stra tegy. That is, while in this life 
we cannot understand without inlagination , it can be claimed that in the next life ~e 
can. Suarez, however, rejected this move, stating that ' this solution is displeasing.' He 
gave two reasons, both of which seem consistent with Pasnau's objection that such a 
move is 'lamely ad hoc.' Indeed Suarez seems even harsher: 'what is advanced,' he said, 
'is rendered useless in every way.'25 In other words it assumes what needs to be proven 
by assuming two different 'states' of the soul, one when it is in a body and another in 
which it is apart from the body. As a solution it begs the question because it asserts that 
the soul can understand without a phantasm when it is separate from the body, but 
what needs to be proven is that the sou] can exist apart from the body in the flrst place. 
Suarez then proceeded to make a three- fold distinction about the way that an 
operation of a power can depend on another material power. An operation can be 
elicited from a power the way that an act ofimagining, for example, is elicited from the 
imagination. In another way, though, an operation might depend on a power insofar as 
the latter provides an object for the operation . T he examples he mentioned involve the 
way that a sensitive appetite depends on imagination and the way that the imagination 
22 ARl, 403a8-9, 1: 642. 
23 ARI, 427b27-428a5, 1: 680. 
24 ' intellegere nostrum neque est nee esse potest sine phantasia' (CDA, disp . 2, a. 3, no . 42, 1: 220). 
25 'Q uia reddit proeesslllll omnjno inmilem ' (ib id. no. 45, 1: 226). 
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depends on external sensation. And in a third way the operation can depend on the 
power as something concomitant. This last sense of dependence, Suarez tells us, is the 
most improper kind of dependence, so it is unlikely that this is what Aristotle meant in 
the conditional under consideration. So only the two proper senses of dependence can 
be involved in Aristotle's claim, and Aristotle was asserting that if understanding is 
imagination, that is, if it is an operation elicited from imagination, or an operation not 
without imagination-if it is of the same order with the operation of imagination, in 
other words-then intellect is not without a body. These are, of course, just Pomop-
nazzi's 'subjective' and 'objective' dependencies in slightly different language. [n short 
assuming the flrst two senses of dependence, the operation of the intellect will always 
need a body and thus there will be no proper operation of the intellect since any 
operation it performs is conunon to both the soul and the body. TIllS, and only this, is 
the proper way to interpret what Aristotle meant in the fmt premise of the argument,z6 
Regarding the second prenllse, there is no way to get around it since it is a given in 
Aristotelian discussions of cognition. There is no understanding without imagination. 
Yet everything is going to tum on a constmal of the way in which the proper operation 
of the intellect depends on imagination. Suarez has now set up the problematic in such 
a way that dependence will jeopardize immortality only if the soul has no proper 
operation at all , that is, if all its operations require the body in the way that an act of 
imagination requires imagination or as imagination requires sensory experience. 
The recurring theme in Pomponazzi's De immortaiitate, reiterated forcefully in his 
response to Contarini, is precisely the dependence of the intellect on imagination, 
which is the same sort of dependence that imagination has in relation to sensory 
experience, that is, objective dependence: 
But although the human intellect, as has been considered, does not use quantity in knowing, 
nevertheless, since it is joined (coniunctus est) to sense, it cannot be released entirely from matter and 
quantity, since it never knows without a phantasm, as Aristotle says in De anima III: 'The soul does 
not know at all without a phantasm.' H ence, it thus needs the body as object. Nor can it know a 
universal unqualifiedly but always sees the universal in the singular, as everyone can observe within 
himself For in all cognition, however far abstracted, it fonns some bodily image (idohnn) 27 
Accordingly what Suarez had to do was develop an account of at least one operation of 
the soul that does not require the body as either a subject (sense one above) or an object 
(sense two above). And the way he attempted that was by emphasizing that the only 
26 CD A, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 45 ,1: 228. 
27 'At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, intelligendo non fungatu r quantitate, attamen, 
quoniam sensui coniunctus est, ex tOto a nlareria et quantitate absolvi non potesc, cum nunlquanl cognoscat 
sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele tenio De anill1a: Neql/aql/all1 sine phantasmate illtelligit allima. Unde sic 
indigens corpore ut obiecto neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universali in singuJari 
speculatur, ut unusquisque in se ipso experiri potest. In omni nal11que quantum cumque abstracta cogni tione 
idolul11 aliquod corporaJe sibi fonnat' (pomponazzi, Tractatlls de ill1l11ortalitate animae, Ch. 9). The translation is 
by William H . Hay in 71,e Ret1aissance Philosophy if Mall , eds. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John 
Hennan R andall Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 319. 
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way the intellect is dependent on imagination is in the improper third sense of the 
tem1-dependence as concomitance. Suarez's actual statement of this view was almost 
breathtaking in its casualness. H e explained that Aristotle was talking about depen-
dence in the subjective and objective sense in premise one but obviously spoke of 
dependence in another way in premise two . The crucial text of De an.il'l'Ia IIl28 that 
seemed to suggest that understanding depended on imagination thus had to be read in 
the third sense of dependence. Suarez concluded: 'and thus this text is solved. ,29 Now 
he does not continue discussing this issue in the question on immortality . R ather he 
indicated that he would treat it when he discussed the way in which the intellect 
depends on imagination, a topic he didn't return to until Disputation Nine. Since 
Suarez has now opened himself to the charge that his solution is lamely ad hoc, I want 
to explain just how he characterized the dependence at issue between the imagination 
and intellect. 
IV: Suarez and the proper operation of the intellect 
[n the Ninth Disputation , Suarez provided an account of the proper operation of the 
intellect that he thought could undelw rite the independence of the soul from the body 
and, by extension, preserve immortality. H e did so by radically reconfiguring the 
relation between imagination and its product, the phantasm, and the work of the 
intellect. The standard story of the relation between phantasm and intellect was a causal 
one. The details might vary between accounts, but that there was some causal 
relationship seems to have been mandated by Aristotle's assertion that there is no 
understanding without imagination. Yet Pomponazzi made clear that an attachment to 
a causal account would make immortality problematic. The very tenn he used, 
admin.icuhIl1'l-a support, or instrumen t-suggests an instrumental function of imagina-
tion for intellect, and we saw that Suarez accepted the fact that using the body as an 
instrument would render an operation common rather than proper.30 So, what Suarez 
did-indeed, what he had no choice but to do, given the way he had set up the 
problem-was to rej ect any causal connection, even an instrumental one, between the 
operation of imagination and the operation of the intellect. 
Elsewhere I have argued that Suarez was committed to a view which I have called 
'cognitive process dualism,' the view that 'no material cognitive process (that is, sensation) 
can really effect a spiritual cognitive result and no spiritual cognitive process can effect a 
change in a material cognitive power.'31 Such a modularity of cognitive processes renders 
problematic Aristotle's claim, which Suarez clearly accepted, that there could be no 
28 ARI, 427b27-428a5, 1: 680. 
29 'Et ita solvitur iste locus' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 45, 1: 228). 
30 Pine translates adllliniCIIlllm as 'cooperation with,' but that doesn't strike me as quite right given Thomas' 
discussion in the passage from Selltellaa libri De anillla, Book l , lectio 2 and his use of 'instrumentum.' 
3 1 See my 'Singular and Universal in Suarez's Account of Cognition,' Review of Metaphysics 55 (2002): 
796ff. 
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understanding without imagination. Mter all , how might we account for the necessity of 
the phantasm unless it played some causal role? Under pressure to fmd a proper operation 
for the intellect, Suarez risked disassociating sensory and intellectual expeti ence. H ere is 
the cnlcial passage from Disputation Nine in which Suarez described the most improper 
form of dependence holding between imagination and intellect: 
For it must be noted that human imagination (phantasia) and intellect are rooted in the same soul and 
thus it is that they have an order (ordo) and hannony (consensio) in their operations. Hence, ... from 
the fact that the intellect operates, the imagination also operates. Therefore, in this way, Jjudge that 
of itself the potential intellect lacks species, but the soul has a spiritual power to produce in the 
potential intellect species of those things that sense knows. [This happens) not by the sensible 
imagination concurring efficiently with that action, but by being related as matter, or by exciting 
the soul , or at any rate (sane)32 by being an exemplar. And thus is happens that as soon as the soul 
knows (cognosci/) something from imagination, through its spiritual power it depicts (depingere), as it 
were, that thing in the potential intellect. 33 
The central point of this passage is clear enough: the soul itselfis the on.ly causal agency in 
the production of the intelligible species through which the intellect petforms its proper 
operation . That is, the intellect has no dependence in either of its two proper m eanings 
on imagination . Of course this raises a host of additional problems, none of which can be 
addressed here . Suffice it to say that Suarez's account provided more than an ad hoc 
explanation for how the intellect could operate apart from the body in the afterlife since 
it operates apart from the body n.ow. It is not the case that the intellect after death will be 
in a different state than that in which it ftnds itself now. It will still be a power of the soul 
whose operation is causally dependent on the soul alone and not the body. If the soul 
becomes aware of the world in som e different way, that would not change the fact that 
the intellect is not dependent on the imagination except in a most improper way. 
While I do not want to discuss issues surrounding the way that the separated soul 
exists and knows,34 I do want to provide two additional passages from the discussion of 
the separated soul that bear on the issue of a correct understanding of this improper 
sense of dependence. Here is the ftrst : 
For species and habits of the intellect and will are spiritual since they are in a spiritual subject and 
do not depend on the body in any way . This is because the body is neither a material nor efficient 
32 The Oxford Latin Dictionary reports that 'sane' can mean 'soundly' or have a concessive force. I have 
op ted for the latter here. 
33 'Est eni l11 advertendum phantasiam et intellectum hominis radica ri in una anima; et hinc est quod in suis 
operibus habent ordinem et consonamiam; unde patebit ... quod eo ipso quod intellecrus operatur, etiam 
imaginatio operatur. Ad hunc ergo 1110dum arbitror intell ectul11 possibilem de se esse nudum speciebus, 
habere tamen animam virtutem spiritualem ad efficiendas species ea rum rerum, quas sensus cognoscit, in 
intellectu possibili, ipsa imaginatione sensibili non concurrenre etIective ad eam actionem, sed habeme se 
quasi materia, aut per modum excitamis animam, aut sane per modu m exemplaris. Et ita fit quod statim ac 
anima per phantasial11 cognoscit aliquid , per vi rtutem suam sp iri tualem quasi depingit rem illam in intellectu 
possibili ' (CDA, disp. 9, q. 2, no. 12,3: 96). 
34 I have started work on that project in an unpublished paper, 'Some Themes in Suarez's Account of the 
Separated Soul.' 
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cause of them since it is of an inferior order. Nor can any other mearung of dependency be 
imagined.35 
Notice that this passage is careful to m ention the two proper types of dependency. It 
would be hard to find a passage that more clearly makes the point that the intellect does 
not depend on the body as either a subj ect or an object. Yet less than a page later we 
find the following: 
For [the intellect] does not depend on it [the body] as on an organ, but depends on it as 
something providing species in this life and because of a certain concomitance of operations. 
Nevertheless, this is not essential to the intellect, but falls to it when it is in the body on account 
of the actual collection (colligationem) of these powers. N evertheless, if the sensitive powers are 
removed, this dependency does not remain .36 
I bring these two passages up to show why it is so hard to recognize the point Suarez was 
making about dependence. H e simply did not have a distinct term to describe the 
improper dependency that characterizes the relation between the proper operation of 
the intellect and the body. Thus, h e slipped rather too easily back to a tenn more 
obviously relevant to a proper dependency. Given the precise and proper senses of the 
tem1 'depend,' though, it was simply wrong to say that the intellect depends on the body: 
The angelic intellect has from its nature innate species of all realities that, as it were, flow from the 
proper power of the intellect as (quasI) passions flow from an essence. However, the sensitive 
power, especially (maxime) the extemal senses, lack species and receive them from outside 
objects. Now OIJr intellect also by its nature lacks species-in which it also falls short of the 
perfection of an angelic intellect-nevertheless it has a certain agreement with it, namely, that as 
soon as our soul knows some reality through the imagination, a species representing that reality 
fl ows (dimanare) fro m the intellect itself So, this agency is more in the manner of a certain 
emanation of the species from the intellect, and thus this agency is not a distinct power37 
35 'Species enim et habitus intellectus et voluntatis sunt spirituales, cum sint in subiecto spirituali nec 
pendent a corpore ullo modo , quia corpus non est causa illarum materialis nec effi ciens, cum sit inferioris 
ordinis, nec potest fingi alius modus dependentiae' (CDA, disp. 14, q. 3, no. 3, 3: 466). 
36 'Nam non pendet ab illo ut ab orga no, sed lit a ministrante species in hac vita et propter quamdam 
concomitantiam operationum; hoc tamen non est essentiale intellectui, sed accidit illi dum est in corpore 
propter actualem colligationem istarum potentiarum, tamen, ablatis potentiis sensitivis, non manet haec 
dependentia' (CDA, disp. 14, q. 3, no. 5, 3: 468). Especially worrisome in trus passage is Suarez's claim that 
the dependence is only needed in this life since it looks as if Suarez might have been relying on the same 
distinction that Aquinas relied on to provide an argument for non-dependence. But it is important to stress 
that what was 'lam ely ad hoc' about Aquinas's introduction of this distinction was that it begged the question, 
which was also Suarez's point in calling it useless . 
37 'Angelicus enim intellect us ex natura sua habet inditas species omnium rerum, quae quasi dimanant a 
virtute propria intellectus, quasi passiones ab essentia; potentia alltem sensitiva, maxime exteriores et 
speciebus carent et illas ab extrinscis obiectis recipiunt; intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus 
caret-in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat-habet tamen convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod 
statim ac anima nostra cognoscit per phantasia m rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu species repraesentans 
rem illam. Unde haec efficientia potius est per modum cuisdam emanationis speciei ab intellectu , et ita non 
est potentia distincta ilia efficientia (CDA, disp. 9, q. 8, no. 18, 3: 234-6, my emphasis). Leen Spruitt in rus 
Species lrttelligibilis: From perceptio/1 to k/10lVledge (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1994) , 2: 304, rejects any 
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Two points need to be made about this. First, the context of the passage involves the 
denial of the distinction between the agent intellect and the potential intellect. Suarez 
admitted that this was an unusual but not unprecedented stance to take. N evertheless 
he found it attractive for the simple reason that otherwise he would have been at a loss 
to explain the purpose of the agent intellect apart fro m its work in conjunction with 
imagination . At the same time- and this is the second point-the passage clearly 
suggests a kind of inn at ism in relation to intelligible species. After all, Suarez's commit-
ment to 'cognitive process dualism ' made the production of intelligible species con-
comitant with the operation of imagination, but causally unconnected with it. In other 
words, it was merely the occasion for the production of the species. 
Let me sum up . Suarez has argued himself into an account of the intellect in which the 
intellect must do it all , as it w ere, because the traditional distinction between agent and 
potential intellects has been eradicated. In addition the intellect is not causally connected 
to the other vital operations of the soul, the common operations. Although, thanks to an 
inner harmony or consonance among its powers, the intellect thinks whenever the 
imagination imagines. The upshot, though, is that by making these radical claims Suarez 
did preserve a proper operation for the intellect-an operation that depended on the body 
neither subjectively nor objectively, but still depended on the body's role of imagination . 
The thoroughgoing insistence by Pomponazzi on the inextricability of matter and form, 
even where that fom1 is a human intellect, had pushed Suarez into a kind of incipient 
dualism. Of course he was only halfway there since he remained committed to a hylo-
morphic analysis of substances, including human beings38 and also because he did not have 
Descartes' conception of matter. N onetheless in consolidating all intellective functions 
within a 'mind' causally unaffected by the body he was clearly pushing the boundaries of 
Aristotelian thought. Hence it does not appear too surprising when Suarez writes: 'How-
ever, in human beings, even though a human being is what especially subsists, nonetheless 
this subsistence is due especially to the soul, which is united to a body not as if it were 
receiving support from the body, but rather as using it as a conjoined instmment.'39 
innatism in Suarez, yet he does so only by reading the just ci ted passage as exclusively about angelic cognition. 
Josef Ludwig, however, in his earlier Das akallsale ZlIsalJlme/,/wirkel' (sympathin) der Seelenvermdgen in der 
Erkem'lnislehre des F. SlIarez (Munich , 1929), 56-7, notes that this passage refers to the human intellect. 
For more discussion on the question of innatism in Suarez's account of cognition, see my 'Suarez on 
Imagination,' Vivarill /lJ 39 (2001): 152--<i. 
38 Just how hylomorphic Suarez's account ultimately was remains unclear. So, for example, he argued that the 
soul even when united to a body it info nns is a 'semi-person.' At the same time he held that the soul was the fonn 
of the body and that in the very essence of the notion offonn we find that itisapt to infonn matter (CDA, disp. 1, 
q. 3, 1: 90). This view is stronger than Aquinas 's assertion that the aptitude to infom1 is not pa rt of the essence of 
fom1 (see SCG, 2.81). An especially puzzling passage occurs in his account of the subsistence of the soul: 
'However, in human beings, even though a hum an being is what especially (praedpllc) subsists, nonetheless this 
subsistence is due especially to the soul, which is united to a body not as if it were receiving support from the 
body, but rather as using it as a conjoined instrument (sed pOlills III II ta/llr iIIo II I illslnlll,eflto cOlli,mao).' 
39 'At in homine, licet quod praecipue subsistit si t homo, tamen haec subsistantia praecipue est ratione 
animae, quae uni tur corpori, non Ut substentur ab ilio, sed potius ut maWr ilio ut instrumento coniuncto' 
(CDA, disp. 14, q. 1, no. 2, 3: 446). 
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In conclusion it may worth noting certain similarities between Suarez and Descartes, 
without indicating any influence. The passages in Descartes that resonate most strongly 
with Suarez's account as I have presented it might be these: 
We make such a judgment not because these things transmit the ideas to our mind through the 
sense organs, but because they transmit something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind 
occasion to form these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it. Nothing reaches our mind from 
external objects through the sense organs except certain corporeal motions, as our author himself 
asserts in article nineteen, in accordance with my own principles. But neither the motions 
themselves nor the figures arising from them are conceived by us exactly as they occur in the 
sense organs, as r have explained at length in my Optics40 
The ideas of pain , colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of 
certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no 
similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.4 1 
One aspect of these passages that strikes me as especially significant is the identification 
of pain , colours, and sounds as innate. While Suarez was careful to demarcate the 
sensitive operations of the soul from the intellectual, it is nonetheless true that he 
thought that our intellectual awareness of such states must be innate, at least if we are to 
generalize the claims about intelligible species in the passage above to cover all 
intelligible species. For Suarez intelligible species can represent both singulars and 
universals . But since an intelligible species is not caused by anything bodily, and is 
produced from the intellect only on the occasion of some sensory operation, it would 
seem that even sensations of singular sounds must be innate. 
As interesting as it would be to compare these passages more fully, the point of this 
chapter is not to show that Suarez is a proto-Cartesian, but rather to show that the 
radical moves Suarez made within the tradition were quite well motivated. Thus 
historians of philosophy ignore the context of a thinker like Suarez with some peril 
when we read him simply as someone who did not understand Aquinas properly.42 In 
addition, that context is one that is decisively shaped by the philosophical movements 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that fact, in tum, suggests that if we really 
want a proper appreciation of the transition to modem philosophy, we are likely to 
find it only through additional explorations of sixteenth-century thinkers. 
40 'Judicemus ... non quia istae res illas ipsas nostrae memi per organa sensuum immisenmt, sed quia 
tamen aliquid inuniserunt, sed quia tamen aliquid inmliserum, quod ei dedit occasionem ad ipsas, per innatam 
sibi £1cultatem, hoc tempore potius quam alio, efformandas. Quippe nihil ab objectis extemis ad memem 
nostrum per organa sensuum accedit, praeter motus quosdam corporeos, ut ipsemet all thor "oster, i" arl. 19, ex 
meis principiis affinnat; sed ne quidem ipsi motus, nec figurae ex iis ortae, a nobis concipiuntur, quales in 
organis sensuum flUnt, ut fuse in Dioplrica explicui' (Rene Descartes, COl1lmetl ls Otl a Certain Broadsheet, AT 8b: 
358-9, CSMK 1: 304). 
41 'Ac tanto magis innatae esse debem ideae doloris, colorum, sonorum, et similium, ut mens nostra possit, 
occasione quorundam motuum corporeorum, sibi eas exhibere; nullam enim similitudinem cum motibus 
corporeis habent' (ibid.). 
42 For a recent example of this mistake, see the discussion of Suarez in P.]. Fitzpatrick and John Haldane, 
'Medieval Philosophy in Later Thought' , in The Ca/l1bridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. 
McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) , 300-8. 
